Environment-Centric Safety Requirements forAutonomous Unmanned Systems by Luo, Yixing et al.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Environment-Centric Safety Requirements
forAutonomous Unmanned Systems
Conference or Workshop Item
How to cite:
Luo, Yixing; Yu, Yijun; Jin, Zhi and Zhao, Haiyan (2019). Environment-Centric Safety Requirements forAutonomous
Unmanned Systems. In: 27th IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE’19), 23-27 Sep 2019,
Jeju, Korea, IEEE.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2019 IEEE
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Environment-Centric Safety Requirements for
Autonomous Unmanned Systems
Yixing Luo1, 2, Yijun Yu3, Zhi Jin1, 2, Haiyan Zhao1, 2
1Key Lab. of High-Confidence Software Technologies (MoU), Peking University, Beijing, China
2Department of Computer Science and Technology, School of EECS, Peking University, Beijing, China
3The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom
Abstract—Autonomous unmanned systems (AUS) emerge to
take place of human operators in harsh or dangerous envi-
ronments. However, such environments are typically dynamic
and uncertain, causing unanticipated accidents when autonomous
behaviours are no longer safe. Even though safe autonomy has
been considered in the literature, little has been done to address
the environmental safety requirements of AUS systematically. In
this paper, we conduct a systematical literature review and set
up a taxonomy of environment-centric safety requirements for
AUS. We then analyse the neglected issues to suggest several new
research directions towards the vision of environmental-centric
safe autonomy.
Index Terms—Unmanned Systems, Autonomy, Environmental
Safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned systems have been exploited in the missions
which are dull, dirty, difficult, and dangerous for humans [1].
Without a human pilot onboard, however, unmanned sys-
tems must be sufficiently autonomous to cope with dynamics
and uncertainties in the environment. Autonomous unmanned
systems (AUSs) emerge to avoid harmful situations for an
extended period without the need for any direct assistance
or intervention from humans. Furthermore, the advent of
AUS is transforming traditional industries of transportation,
manufacturing and logistics [2].
Historically, numerous crashes have occurred during the
testing or operation of AUSs. There have been hundreds of
“CLASS A” (destroyed the aircraft or caused at least $2
million damage) crashes of military drones [3]. This year,
all Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft have been grounded after its
second crash triggered by an automated system known as
the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System1. This
presents a dilemma to AUSs between potential benefits and
risks. In general, for AUSs applied to safety-critical scenarios
(i.e. transportation, search and rescue, surgery, etc.), safety
requirements for AUSs should involve all stakeholders, as
a tiny mistake could result in human injuries, significant
property loss, or damage to the environment.
Safety concerns of AUSs have been a recognised problem on
the agenda of stakeholders. Responsible authorities or organi-
sations have formulated safety regulations and standards (e.g.,
CAP 722 for unmanned aircraft systems by Civil Aviation
Authority [4]). The York Global Initiative for Safe Autonomy2
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX_groundings
2https://www.york.ac.uk/safe-autonomy
aims at safe autonomy techniques for an enriched, healthier
and more sustainable society.
Currently, many researchers concentrate on AUS safety,
e.g., faults detection and diagnosis in robotic systems [5] and
potential safety and security threats assessment for drones [6].
Here, safety is regarded as an inherent quality and the system
is required to be free from losses and accidents caused by
failures and errors. However, for an AUS operating in an actual
environment, merely running the system correctly to ensure the
safety of the system is not enough [7]. With an incomplete
assumption of system states and environmental conditions,
unanticipated accidents may occur in the interaction between
the AUS and environment. Therefore, there is a quest for
a taxonomy of environmental safety requirements to further
constrain the system’s autonomous behaviours.
To have a clear view of the fundamental environment-centric
safety requirements for AUSs, we carry out a systematic
literature review on this topic and figure out countermeasures
to provide guarantees for its safe operations. We investigated
papers from 2009 to 2019 about safety concerns for AUSs
including drones and other robotic systems. All the articles
are reviewed with respect to two research questions: (a) what
environmental-centric safety requirements are put forward?
and (b) how to satisfy these requirements autonomously?
Specifically, we set up a model for conceptual architecture
to describe the interaction of autonomous unmanned systems
and environment. Entities in the environment are classified
as other systems, humans, and constraints for AUS to obey.
Environment-centric safety requirements are elicited from
these entities, i.e., the AUS is responsible for the insistence
and correctness of its behaviours by eliminating internal risks
and potential conflicts to protect the environment from harm.
We examine the existing countermeasures from the perspective
of processes in the AUS’s working flow to see whether those
requirements can be well implemented in AUS.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
describes the interaction architecture between the AUS and its
environment. Section III sets up a taxonomy of environment-
centric safety requirements for AUSs based on the interac-
tion architecture. Section IV presents the survey results by
analysing existing solutions and their maturity from the survey
and proposes open research problems. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AUSS AND ENVIRONMENT
The robotic systems are AUSs. From systematic literature
reviews [8], [9], most robotic systems follow a system archi-
tecture of control loops with the monitoring-planning-analysis-
execution (MAPE) loops [10]. Following this discovery, we
develop a conceptual reference architecture for characterising
the interactions between an autonomous unmanned system
(AUS) and its environment, as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Interaction architecture for AUS and environment
This architecture highlights the structural relationship be-
tween an AUS and its operating environment. To highlight the
environmental properties in relation to safety requirements,
we represent the context diagram of the system by using
the notations of the Problem Frames [11]: rectangular nodes
denote the domain entities and edges their shared interfaces,
where arrows highlight the direction of control.
Based on the control theory, an AUS consists of the con-
trolled system and the controller [12]. It is the autonomous
controller that monitors input disturbances, or analyses the
execution results, to generate the plan for the controlled system
to actuate. These steps form nested feedback and/or feed-
forward loop. Here, the Operational Goals represents the
requirements for the system to achieve. For example, “more
responsive” is one of the non-functional requirements and
“measuring the distance to the destination” is one of the func-
tional requirements. Adjustments are taken by the actuators
in the controlled system according to the plan computed by
the controller to close the gap between the Operational Goals
and the monitoring inputs in a feed-forward loop, or reduce
the error between the Operational Goals and the execution
outputs in a feedback loop.
The environment interacts with the system through inputs
and outputs. Typically, the environment consists of multiple
types of domain entities, including other (unmanned) systems
sharing the same environment, people around, and physi-
cal/logical entities that may pose constraints such as obstacles
to avoid, rules/standards to obey, etc. Amongst them, humans
are biddable domains marked by “B” in the bottom-right cor-
ner, the physical entities are causal domains marked by “C”,
and the logical entities are lexical domains marked by “X”.
Differences of these environmental entities in varying degrees
of dynamics and uncertainties could have significant impact
on the behaviour of the system and its safety requirements.
III. ENVIRONMENT-CENTRIC SAFE AUTONOMY
In the literature, most of the safety concerns about AUS and
its runtime environment can be classified as (i) malfunction or
incorrect actions of AUS, resulting in failures and errors; (ii)
conflicts with entities in the environment. Environment-centric
requirements are put forward to map these safety concerns
into implementable requirements for AUSs, among which,
hazard-elimination and conflict-avoidance describe the ability
of AUSs to protect the environment from being threatened.
To address these safety concerns, solutions have been pro-
posed at different stages of the MAPE workflow illustrated
in the interaction architecture (Section II). Furthermore, each
process can be refined into sub-dimensions with respect to the
properties of the safety methods.
A. Taxonomy of Safety Requirements for AUSs
1) Hazard-elimination: Conventionally, hazard-elimination
is required to be designed into an AUS to minimise or
eliminate hazards that arise from AUS failures and errors (e.g.,
design flaws, or poor performance with uncertainties in the
environment). Fail-safe and fault-tolerance are the abilities and
requirements of an AUS to protect the environment from being
threatened in the event of failures and errors.
A fail-safe system responds in a way that causes little
harm to the entities in the environment inherently, in the
sense that being fail-safe either anomaly (i.e. deviation from
normal behaviours) or system failures that may be posed to
the environment can be detected so that risk reduction methods
are leveraged to mitigate those potential hazards [13].
Compared with fail-safe, fault-tolerance mechanisms enable
the system to continue its intended operations, or at a reduced
level, rather than allowing it to fail. That is the reason why
fault-tolerance is essential for life-critical systems.
2) Conflict-avoidance: Mitigation of risks is not always
sufficient in safety-critical situations in the environment when
there is little tolerance to accidents and losses such as human
injuries, property damages, ecological harm. In advance, an
AUS is required to be aware of avoiding risks, i.e., restriction
violations, unintentional decision conflicts or collisions with
other systems or human beings, etc.
Typically, AUSs are not working alone. They may share
resources with other systems in the environment at different
contextual levels. Examples of such inter-system conflict-
avoidance requirements include UAVs, self-driving cars on
the roads, co-robots, etc. Therefore, the relationship of AUSs
with related systems should be dealt with carefully to avoid
interfering with their normal functions.
During the interaction between human and robotic systems,
especially when direct contact occurs between a person and
a robot, it is essential to ensure that the human partner is
safe [14]. To improve the safety of those humans interacting
with an AUS, the system needs to be accountable for its
actions. Namely, rational decisions are made to avoid potential
physical injuries, privacy invasion, and assets loss.
In real-life scenarios, constraints for AUS safety autonomy
always exist, and they are strongly related to environmental
conditions. Such constraints, being specifically defined in
different scenarios, can be logistic regulations and standards
to obey, physical obstacles to avoid in real-world, and spatial
restrictions like protected zones, etc. Compared to autonomous
systems operating indoor or on the ground, the autonomy of
the systems in 3-D open spaces such as the air spaces or the sea
areas might be better achieved with fewer physical obstacles.
However, natural disturbances and obstacle modelling are
harder to handle when planning a collision-free way [6]. It
is thus important for AUSs to be aware of the environmental
conditions and constraints because the differences in these
features could lead to completely distinct safety requirements.
B. Procedures for Safety in AUSs
Workflows in AUSs can be described from monitoring
(input), analyzing (feed-forward and feedback), planning and
execution (output) procedures, as shown in Figure 1. We
further refine them into sub-dimensions at different steps
according to the property of proposed solutions.
1) Monitoring: To cope with the complexity of environ-
ments, monitoring is the prerequisite for AUSs to detect safety
risks and make appropriate decisions. The methods of self-
state monitoring and environment awareness fall into proactive
and reactive categories.
Equipped with proactive sensors, AUSs can collect infor-
mation about the physical world to achieve internal desires or
intentions proactively [15]. This ability refers to being aware
of those underlying risks in the system or the uncertainty and
dynamics in the environment (e.g., unknown obstacles [16],
intruding vehicles [17]) earlier to prevent problems from
happening in the first place.
For reactive sensing, changes of environmental properties
and monitored parameters of systems trigger system’s re-
actions after analysing and planning. Traditional approaches
respond to risks by identifying a vulnerability and developing
a patch to eliminate it, similar to securing the air vehicle
systems [18]. With less time to reason and predict, this cycle
repeats itself with each newly found risk.
2) Analysing: With the information collected by the sensors
or monitors, the AUS can make reasonable assumptions about
its own and environmental states to avoid dangerous situations.
The main task is to detect where the failure or risk occurs.
Reasoning and prediction of the external environmental
states depend on the prior knowledge acquired from domain
experts (i.e., the given environment model) or on a large
quantity of experience learnt from both successes and failures
in previous explorations (i.e., the learnt environment model).
An environment model can be set up before the system is put
into use, while a data-efficient learning process with safety-
critical constraints [19] is needed for environment modelling
if there are insufficient contextual information and domain
knowledge at design time.
3) Planning: In response to the changes and safety threats
in the environment, decisions for the action policy are made by
the AUS. Similar to different types in self-adaptive systems,
the planning for AUSs has either offline (static) or online (dy-
namic) ways for policy generation and decision-making [20].
Assuming that the safety concern has been revealed before
the mission starts, time is taken to optimise safety strate-
gies usually. However, such countermeasures only have pre-
determined or fixed number of actions and rules based on
developers’ analysis.
Rule-based motion planning is suitable for handling well-
examined errors and failure modes in the system and pre-
determined constraints outside the system. On the other hand,
adaptive actions and policies can be extended at runtime
through the online planning process. It seems that the online
learning-based and the dynamic planning algorithms have a
greater potential than offline ones in more complicated tasks.
4) Execution: To apply policies decided by the planning
process, effectors map the commands into actions according
to their underlying techniques, getting rid of unsafe states and
solving conflicts either independently or cooperatively [21].
For the independent mechanism, AUSs are fully responsible
for their behaviours to ensure environmental safety. In this
case, the designers care less about the external systems, but
keep raising their own AUSs’ self-adaptive ability in face
of external risks [22]. However, it calls for a cooperative
collision-avoidance and scheduling scheme for AUSs that
sharing contexts with other systems and/or human beings.
Collaboration and coordination mechanisms can raise the
efficiency of problem-solving. Communication protocol needs
to be deployed for information sharing [23].
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFE AUSS
In this section, we clarify our survey process and analyse
the results so that it is possible to discern gaps in addressing
safety requirements.
A. Systematic Literature Survey
According to the taxonomy illustrated in Section III, our
review has ended with a total of 64 papers from 2009 to
2019, after applying inclusion (e.g., considering only jour-
nal, conference papers) and exclusion criteria (e.g., removing
duplicate entries and considering only the extended version
with complete solutions to the question) to the initial search
results. We use these selective papers to analyse environment-
centric safety concerns for AUSs and evaluate the maturity of
solutions at different stages of the workflow in AUSs.
The survey results of the state-of-the-art research on this
topic are classified as shown in Table I, in which, we use
three kinds of icons to qualitatively indicate the maturity of
the solution proposed:
Table I
ENVIRONMENT-CENTRIC SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR AUSS FROM DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF AUTONOMY.
Environment-Centric 
Safety 
Requirements
Procedures for safety in AUS 
Monitoring Analysing Planning Execution
proactive reactive environment model given
environment 
model learning offline online independent collaborative
Hazard-
elimination
fail-safe [30] [26] [27] [29] [22] [29]
fault-tolerance [30] [27] [30] [23] [32] [33] [23]
Conflict-
avoidance
inter-system [25] [35] [34] [44] [35] [34] [34] [49]
human [37] [8] [8] [37] [8] [38] [38] [39]
constraints [40] [43] [24] [19] [41] [19] [19]
Productivity TriggerEnlightenment
The icons refer to the maturity of existing solutions for AUSs to satisfy environmental safety requirements in the workflow.
• Productivity: methods for this step of the workflow are
well-examined or there is a well-established methodology
to solve safety concerns, e.g., methods for collision-
avoidance threat assessment and decision making in in-
telligent vehicle systems have been classified in [24].
• Enlightenment: There is room for making progress on op-
timising existing solutions, e.g., safety constrained MDP
has been proposed for autonomous robots in a previously
unknown environment [19]; however, the technique can-
not handle more complex scenarios.
• Trigger: More research efforts are needed to narrow the
gap between requirements and the realities, e.g., with
more unmanned systems sharing the same working space.
It is important for the proposed techniques to be aware
of and not interfere with other systems [25].
Furthermore, a few intersections between safety and au-
tonomous concerns are not covered by the existing work
surveyed.
B. Analysing Results
In the literature, hazard-elimination is regarded as the basic
requirement for environmental safety. Failure modes [26] and
risk models [27] are identified and established at design time
to examine whether controlled variables are out of the safe
boundary [28]. On detecting the anomaly, emergency plans
such as emergency pause (e.g., stopping system’s motion)
and emergency stop (e.g., disabling its power module [29])
are carried out according to handmade rules for fail-safe.
Online planning is sometimes needed for drones to return
autonomously to its starting point after GPS spoofing [22].
At least in some researchers’ opinion [30], however, trying
to identify and avoid any source of disruptions is in vain and
what matters for AUSs is how to control the vulnerabilities and
automatically restore its normal state. That partially explains
why proactive monitoring is less covered in AUSs. The real-
isation of fault-tolerance puts forward higher demand on the
system to recover from failures or erroneous states. Data-based
anomalies detection and analysis are well achieved for fault de-
tection in literature [31]. Recovery policies and measures can
be real-time signal reconstruction [32], motion modification,
and mission adjustment [33], roles reversal between different
agents in the system [23], etc.
Conflict-avoidance is critical for autonomous systems de-
ployed in actual scenarios, as it is the fundamental requirement
from the environment. Competitions exist when resources
shared by AUSs with other systems are limited, and AUSs
should be careful of possible intruders and assure the safety
of other systems [34]. In crowded workspaces (e.g., roads,
factories, urban airspace), the systems’ capability of sensing
and avoiding other systems is crucial. Efforts have been done
in inter-system communication and coordination (e.g., a UAV
can broadcast its location to other vehicles for identifying and
making way). Reminder from those scheduling systems like
TCAS [35] is widely-used as guidance for aviation navigation.
Although those manually specified rules and inter-operable
equipment enjoy high credits from the authorities, they cannot
solve the problem of bandwidth limit as extra information
is transmitted and difficulty in heterogeneous autonomous
systems communication [36].
To protect human safety and assets in human-AUS coexis-
tence environment, solutions have been proposed that monitor
the amount of energy injected into the system by actua-
tor [8], predict human motions [37], real-time motion plan
and control design for human-robot collaborative safety [38],
change safe regions of the system dynamically [9]. Realising
of high likelihood to fail, robots can also report the risk
to its user [39]. Equipped with high-precision cameras for
environmental information collection, AUSs may also intrude
into human being’s private space [6] and be regraded as
“spiders” from users’ perceptions. Claims for more “friendly”
AUSs may help to ease this conflict by increasing the sense
of safety and security of human beings.
For various kinds of constraints in the environment, coun-
termeasures for neither physical [40] nor logical [17] or
geopolitical [41] restrictions are covered in the literature. Most
techniques for conflict avoidance with dynamic or uncertain
physical obstacles operate in a timely fashion, which relies on
the system’s ability to proactively perceiving and planning.
Given the behaviour models of the external entity, scene
analysing and prediction can be framed as Markov decision
process (MDP) [42] or its variants POMDP [40]. In the
absence of models, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) and
its variants Bayesian IRL [19] and deep IRL could infer latent
reward function by exploration and exploitation.
For the assurance of safety and privacy of protected areas,
constraints can be settled inherently like geo-fencing system
used by DJI [43]. However, there are also reasons for tem-
porarily forbidden flights in certain events, e.g., the lack of
updating the latest no-fly zones could exert a serious impact
on those protected areas.
C. Open Problems and Challenges
Apart from the existing solutions for AUSs working in a
mission-critical environment safely, additional directions need
further investigations.
Learning-based Environmental Model Structures. With
little domain knowledge, it is challenging to acquire a well-
established environment model at design time for those un-
charted areas. As such, reinforcement learning may help
through iterative trial-and-error to accumulate experience from
the interactions for the system to be aware of opponent factors
in the environment [44]. However, the cost of repairing and
the lack of tolerance to execution failures highly restrict its
learning ability [19].
Additionally, certifications for learning-based components
are suspected given the inherent vulnerability of neural net-
works [45]. Taking a combined view of software engineer-
ing and dependability of artificial intelligence, the safety of
learning-enabled components in AUSs should be verified.
Initial attempt [46] has been taken at the verification of an
artificial neural network-based feed-forward loop controller.
Addressing Complexity in Online Planning. Towards
full autonomy, it is critical that the AUSs are capable of
responding to anomalous events while minimising underlying
risks. Through dynamic planning online, more uncertain and
risky situations in the environment can be handled; however,
due to unpredictability, less reliability, and trustworthiness, it
is not so well accepted by safety regulators and authorities
compared with manually specified rules [47].
Besides, online planning occupies intensive computing
resources of embedded systems or depends on the high-
bandwidth and low-latency to offload computation to the
cloud. Therefore, a common way is to combine the strengths
of individual methods, i.e., by adjusting the parameters of
manually created rules actively at runtime [17] or by allowing
online modifications of precomputed offline results [48]. To
relieve this burden, it is hoped that computations can be
off-loaded to the cloud system with less latency if the 5th
Generation Wifi is widely deployed.
Collaboration for Environment Safety. To go beyond
the capabilities or knowledge of the individual system, a
loosely-coupled network formulated by multiple interacting
controlled systems for the mission complement is impor-
tant in practice (e.g., Amazon Prime Air). With alternative
equipment and agents, fault-tolerance can be better achieved
intra-system [23]. Additionally, coordination and negotiation
between the system and its collaborators help with a more
efficient resolution for potential conflicts [36]. Considering
the heterogeneous technologies underlying autonomous cyber-
physical systems, it is difficult for regulatory authorities to
make generally-applicable rules [47].
Without a centralised architecture or central controller,
however, a common semantics for information processing
is required to achieve consensus agreement amongst intra-
system or inter-system [49] parties in a collaborative context.
In another way, raising the ability to be self-adaptive and
deployment enough for the safety of the entire group, e.g.,
minimising the gaps with partners or learn from its opponents
in the environment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
AUSs are likely to flourish in a foreseeable future. However,
they need to ensure the safety of the entities in their operating
environment.
This paper reports our findings from a literature review
of environment-centric concerns for AUSs. Using a control-
theoretic reference architecture, we classify the requirements
of environmental safety in an MAPE process and examine their
somewhat latent relationships. From this analysis, a taxonomy
of environment-centric safety requirement is proposed and a
few research directions are suggested to provide safety to
AUSs. We hope that this work will motivate the research com-
munity to focus more on addressing the challenges identified,
making the future AUSs environmentally safer.
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